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TOURO LAWREVIEW
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Hall...
(decided February 7, 1997)
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed defendant's
conviction of criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree.1 2 Defendant, Roosevelt Hall, Sr.,
contended that the county court erred because it allowed an
officer to give testimony that defendant was previously involved
in two drug transactions that did not result in any charge of taped
conversations. " Further, defendant contended that the court
improperly admitted the transcripts that were recorded by the
undercover officer." 4 In addition, defendant contended that the
jury instruction was improper with respect to a defense witness
"1 236 A.D.2d 789, 654 N.Y.S.2d 491 (4th Dep't 1997).
12 Id. at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d 493.
"I Id. at 789, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492. The court, responded to the defendant's
contention stating that although the prosecution could not seek to prove crimes
(prior drug transactions) not charged in the indictment, "[e] vidence of those
prior drug transactions was admissible to show defendant's pattern of
executing drug transactions through the same agent" based on its probative
value. Id. at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492. In addition, the court gave limiting
instructions to the jury indicating that the past drug offenses were not to be
used to suggest the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes charged. Id.
at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (citing People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350,
359, 420 N.E.2d 59, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261(1981); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d
40, 396 N.E.2d 735, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341(1979); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y.
264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); People v. Battles, 83 A.D.2d 164, 443 N.Y.S.2d
932 (4th Dep't 1981)). Id.
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who exercised his Fifth Amendment" 5 privilege to remain
silent.116
The Fourth Department affirmed the conviction, holding that it
was not error to admit evidence of the defendant's prior drug
transactions when "'evidence of prior crime is probative of the
crime now charged .... ",,,7  Further, the court held that the
tape-recording transcript was admissible even though they were
partly inaudible because of the curative jury instructions, absence
of objection and the defendant's failure to submit an alternative
transcript.' In addition, the court held that because the
defendant did not object to the court's jury instruction regarding
the witness' invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent, the objection was not preserved for appeal." 9 However,
the court stated that even if the issue had been properly preserved
it would have held the jury instructions to be proper."
During trial, the witness for the prosecution, an undercover
officer, testified that he spoke to the defendant and James
Higdon, a witness for the defense, after arriving at a liquor store
on September 24, 1991, for the purpose of purchasing cocaine.'
Following the discussion, the officer paid the defendant $100.00
for five bags of cocaine." Defendant put the money into the
cash register and then told Higdon to retrieve the cocaine.'
After Higdon left for the cocaine, the defendant and the officer
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"INIor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.. . ." Id. N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 6. Article I section 6 of the
New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " Id.
116 Hall, 236 A.D.2d at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492-93.
117 Id. at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (quoting People v. Ventimiglia, 52
N.Y.2d at 359, 420 N.E.2d at 62, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 264).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
12 Id.
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took a ride to an area near the liquor store." During the ride the
officer wore a tape recording device."Z Defendant and the officer
remained there for a short time before driving toward a
laundromat, and on the way they saw Higdon.'26 After emerging
from the car, the defendant conversed with Higdon who then
brought five red baggies of cocaine to the officer at the passenger
side of the car. 1
Addressing Higdon's application of his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent on the witness stand, the Hall court stated that the
"[d]efendant did not object to the court's instructions to the jury
that it could consider the refusal of Higdon to answer only on the
issue of his credibility as a witness.""2 8 Therefore, the defendant
did not preserve this issue for appeal. 2 9 However, the court
further stated that if the issue had been preserved it would have,
"as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice.., concluded
that the instruction was proper . ., 130
The court relied on People v. Siegel131 in support of its
conclusion.132 In Siegel, defendant was present at a large party in
"u Id. The recording, made possible by the body-wire on the undercover
officer during the automobile ride, was transcribed and admitted only as an
aid. Id. at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (citing People v. Norwood, 142 A.D.2d
885, 531 N.Y.S.2d 385 (3d Dep't 1988)). "Once audibility is established, it is
within the trial court's discretion whether to admit transcripts as an aid to the
jury ...." Norwood, 142 A.D.2d at 885, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
'25 Hall, at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
'26 Id. at 789, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
127 Id.
'2 Id. at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
129 Id.
130 Id. In the matter of issue preservation for appellate review, the court
cited N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2) (McKinney 1997) which states in
pertinent part that:
For purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a
ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or
proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was
registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such
ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court
had an opportunity of effectively changing the same.
Id.
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Long Island, and was accompanied by four friends from Queens
and a neighborhood friend, Gourdin Heller. 13  After the
defendant allegedly made some racial remarks to a former
girlfriend, about her current boyfriend, Jermaine Ewell, she
relayed those remarks to Ewell."M Thereafter, Ewell confronted
the defendant and a heated confrontation erupted between the two
groups of friends. 135 Defendant and his friends were chased away
by Ewell and his friends, but after discussing the ordeal, later
returned to the party area armed with bats and sticks obtained at
the defendant's house. 136  "According to prosecution witnesses,
defendant approached Ewell from behind and hit him on the back
of his head with a bat. As Ewell lay on the ground, he was
repeatedly beaten with the bats and sticks, suffering multiple skull
fractures." 
137
"Defendant was convicted of assault, first and second degrees,
conspiracy in the fourth degree, riot in the second degree, and
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, [and] [t]he Appellate
Division affirmed .... , On appeal the defendant relied on
Gourdin Heler as a witness in order to corroborate the
defendant's testimony. 13  However, the prosecution attempted to
impeach Heller on cross examination and Heller, at risk of
perjury and self incrimination, asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege by remaining silent.14 After the prosecution failed to
exercise their option to have Heller's testimony stricken, the
court, at the request of the prosecution, instructed the jury that
they could consider Heller's silence as a factor against his
credibility. 4 Siegel's contended that the court erred by giving
132 Hall, 236 A.D.2d at 790, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
133 Siegel, 87 N.Y.2d at 539-40, 663 N.E.2d at 873, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
34Id. at 546, 663 N.E.2d at 877, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 836.




"I Id. at 541, 663 N.E.2d at 873, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
139 Id. at 541, 663 N.E.2d at 874, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
140 Id. at 541-42, 663 N.E.2d at 874, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
141 Id. at 542, 663 N.E.2d at 874, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
1998 1255
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this instruction.1 42  The Appellate Court held that the jury
instruction was not error under the circumstances, because
"Heller's direct testimony was favorable to [the] defendant"
4 1
and because the prosecution was prevented from cross
examination of Heller's direct testimony.'44
Under circumstances where a witness invokes a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination which deprives
the prosecution of cross examination, the court found that there
existed three levels of remedial action.14' Depending on the
relationship of the testimony such remedial action may include
striking the entire testimony, striking part of the testimony or
giving a corrective jury instruction involving the witness's
credibility. 146 Because the court could have stricken all of the
witness's testimony the "defendant [was] hardly in a position to
complain of the less drastic remedy the court applied for the
deprivation of the People's right of cross-examination .... 147
142 Id.
141 Id. at 543, 663 N.E.2d at 875, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
144 Id. at 543-44, 663 N.E.2d at 875, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 834. "Under such
circumstances, the prosecution was entitled to have Heller's direct testimony
stricken in its entirety and the jury instructed to disregard it . . . ." Id. (citing
People v. Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22, 28, 490 N.E.2d 505, 449 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1986).
141 Siegel, 87 N.Y.2d at 544, 663 N.E.2d at 875, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
146 Id. In setting forth the three levels of distinction with regard to the
remedies, the court states in pertinent part:
In the leading case of United States v. Cardillo, the court
posed three graduated levels of remedial action. The first is
where the witness refused to testify on questions of matters
"so closely related to the commission of the crime that the
entire testimony of the witness should be stricken." The
second is where the refusal to answer was "connected solely
with one phase of the case in which event a partial striking
might suffice." The third and least drastic relief "would
involve collateral matters or cumulative testimony concerning
credibility which would not require a direction to strike and
which could be handled (in a jury case) by the judge's charge
if questions as to the weight to be ascribed to such testimony
arose."
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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The Hall court stated that had the issue been preserved, it
would have held that a defense witness's right to assert his Fifth
Amendment protection against self incrimination does not
interfere with the prosecution's right to cross examination
because remedial measures are available as discussed above.'
The jury instructions given by the Hall court providing that the
jury was permitted to consider the witness's refusal to testify to
affect only his credibility, allowed the jury the benefit of drawing
inferences while at the same time protecting the witness against
self incrimination. The court's interpretation is that a witness's
right to invoke his privilege of silence was not diminished by the
court's instruction allowing the jury to consider the silence as
affecting the witness's credibility."' This instruction was the





(decided May 5, 1997)
During 1996, five corrections officers were indicted for the
falsification of business records in the first degree, "offering a
false instrument for filing in the first degree," and "assault in the
third degree." 2 Petitioner, Norman Seabrook, President of the
Correction Officers' Benevolent Association, is the collective
bargaining representative for about 10,000 New York City
148 People v. Hall, 236 A.D.2d at 789-90, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 491-93 (4th
Dep't 1997).
149 Siegel, 87 N.Y. 2d at 545, 663 N.E.2d 876, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
1
50 Id. at 544, 663 N.E.2d 875, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (citing People v. Chin,
67 N.Y.2d 22, 28, 490 N.E.2d 505 (1986)).
... 173 Misc. 2d 15, 660 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1997).
'5 Id at 16, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Note, Henry Neil was indicted for
falsiPfyg business records and "offering a false instrument," but he was not
indicted for charges of assault. Id.
1998 1257
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